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ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses the validity of the justifications for the mandatory disclosure 
regime imposed on issuers of securities to the public in New Zealand. In Part I, there 
is a description of the statutory requirements comprising this regime. In Part II, 
firstly, the justifications for the mandatory disclosure requirements imposed under the 
Companies Act 1993 are considered. These justifications are distinguished from the 
ones imposed on issuers of securities by the SA 1978 and the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange listing rules. Secondly, the likely level of security disclosure under a 
voluntary disclosure regime is set out. Thirdly, there is a discussion of the 
justifications for the mandatory disclosure regime in the Securities Act 1978 and the 
New Zealand Stock Exchange listing rules. The primary justifications are arranged 
in two categories these are efficiency justifications and fairness justifications. This 
section considers the effect of market forces, the effect of the action of the share 
market, the impact of the Companies Act 1993 disclosure requirements, and relevance 
of other options (beside mandatory disclosure) for solving the problems discussed. In 
Part III, the paper concludes that there is little justifiable reason for a mandatory 
disclosure regime but that New Zealand needs to retain its regime to maintain 
international confidence it its share-market. 




This paper examines the reasons for requiring issuers of securities to the public in 
New Zealand to disclose information. 
In Part I, four levels of regulation are outlined. Firstly, general misrepresentation 
law which prohibits misrepresentations in trade and misrepresentations that induce 
entry into a contract. Secondly, the Companies Act 1993 which imposes disclosure 
requirements on companies. Thirdly, the Securities Act 1978 and the Financial 
Reporting Act 1993 which impose disclosure requirements on issuers of securities to 
the public. Finally, the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE) listing rules, which 
impose additional disclosure requirements on issuers, listed on the NZSE. 
In Part II, the justifications for mandatory disclosure are set out. I will not question 
the necessity of the first two levels of regulation (misrepresentation law and company 
law) but I will examine the justifications for the second two levels (the Securities Act 
1978 and the NZSE listing rules). The latter two levels of regulation form the 
'mandatory disclosure regime' imposed on issuers of securities. 
Part III provides a conclusion concerning whether this mandatory disclosure regime 
is justified. 
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PART I THE NEW ZEALAND REGULATORY REGIME 
I THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTATION 
A The Fair Trading Act 1986 
Section 9 of the Fair Trading Act [FT A 1986] deals with pre-contractual 
misrepresentations. This section says, "No person shall, in trade, engage in conduct 
that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive." Sections 10 and 11 
of the FT A 1986 prohibit misleading conduct in trade in relation to goods and 
services. Section 13 of the FT A 1986 concerns false representations connected with 
the supply or promotion of goods or services. Falsely representing that goods or 
services are of a particular quality, have any performance characteristics, are 
endorsed, or have a guarantee or warranty is prohibited. 
Conduct caught under section 9 includes omissions. 1 Silence is forbidden if it is 
misleading or deceptive. This would generally need "some conduct that is ancillary to 
the silence, and when construed with the silence creates the misrepresentation."2 
Thus, a promoter of securities could be caught under the FT A 1986 for any disclosure 
or non-disclosure that is a misrepresentation, and for making certain false 
representations connected with the supply of the securities. 
There are extensive penalties for a breach of the FT A 1986. These include; an 
injunction restraining a person from engaging in conduct that would breach the Act,3 
variation or avoidance of a contract between the person who engaged in the conduct 
and the person who suffered damage or is likely to suffer damage (or, if the Court 
thinks fit, an order that the contract is to have been void ab initio),4 and an order that 
1 Fair Trading Act 1986, s 2(2)(a) [FT A 1986]. 
2 Raynor Asher, "The Vile Intrusion I Magnificent Intervention of the Fair Trading Act into Contracts" 
[1996] NZLJ 85, 86. 
3 FTA 1986, s 41(1). 
4 FT A 1986, s 43(2)(a) and (b). 
4 
person who engaged in the conduct refund or pay damages to the person who suffered 
the Joss or damage.5 
B The Common Law 
In common law, misrepresentation is an area of the Jaw of contract. It has been 
defined as where "one party is induced to enter into [a] contract by the false assertion 
of the other. "6 Misrepresentations can be intentional or unintentional. For a 
misrepresentation to occur there needs to be a representation that induces entry into a 
contract resulting in loss to the representee.7 
The "general rule is that silence cannot constitute misrepresentation."8 However 
there are a number of exceptions to this. 
In the English case of R v Kylsant9 the Court of Criminal Appeal dealt with 
statements in a prospectus relating to the issue of debenture stock. Although the 
statements were all true they were "utterly misleading" 10 and the prospectus was held 
to be false. The statements were rendered "essentially untrue" 11 by silence that 
created a false impression. Thus silence may constitute a misrepresentation. In the 
New Zealand case of King v Wilkinson 12 Holland J noted that "[i]n certain limited 
circumstances misrepresentation can arise from silence." 13 Holland J held that 
whether a misrepresentation has been made is a question of fact. In King v Wilkinson 
it was decided that there was a misrepresentation when a vendor of a property did not 
alert the purchaser that the fence was not on the true boundary of the property. 
5 Ff A 1986, s 43(2)( c) and ( d). 
6 R D Mulholland, Introduction to the New Zealand Legal System (9 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 
1999) 257. 
7 Mulholland, above n 6, 259. 
8 Francis Dawson and David W. McLauchlan The Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (Sweet & Maxwell, 
Auckland, 1981) 20. 
9 [1932] 1 KB 442. 
10 R v Kylsant, above n 10, 449. 
11 Mulholland, above n 6, 258. 
12 Unreported, High Court, Christchurch CP 134/92, 29 March 1994. 
13 King v Wilkinson above n 12. 
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'Contracts uberrimae fidei' are contracts where "one party alone possesses full 
knowledge of all the material facts." 14 In these contracts the common law requires the 
knowledgeable party to disclose all material facts. This rule usually applies m 
insurance contracts but may also be relevant to contracts for the sale of securities. 
Where there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties to a contract "silence 
could amount to a misrepresentation" 15 Fiduciary relationships arise where there is a 
relationship of trust between the parties, for instance a solicitor and client. It is 
possible that because of the asymmetry of information between the vendor of 
securities and the subscriber a fiduciary relationship might arise. 16 In this situation 
silence may be a misrepresentation. Therefore in some situations the issuer would be 
obliged to disclose information. 
The above discussion shows that there is sometimes an obligation to disclose 
information imposed on parties to a contract. There is also liability for a disclosure of 
information that constitutes a misrepresentation. 
C The Contractual Remedies Act 1979 
The remedies for misrepresentation are contained in the Contractual Remedies Act 
1979 [CRA 1979]. Section 6 of the CRA 1979 entitles a party to a contract to claim 
damages from the other party for a misrepresentation, inducing them to enter into the 
contract, made by that party. Section 7(3)(a) of this Act allows a party to a contract to 
cancel the contract if they have been induced to enter into it by a misrepresentation 
made by the other party to the contract. These sections apply regardless of whether 
the misrepresentation is innocent or fraudulent. These remedies are Jess extensive 
than those under the FTA 1986 are. 
14 J F Northey, Cheshire and Fifoot 's Law of Contract (6 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1984) 234. 
15 RD Mulholland Business Law Today (4 ed, The Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1995) 161. 
16 In Coleman and Others v Myers and Others [1977] 2 NZLR 298 (CA) the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal held that the directors of a company owed fiduciary duties to the shareholders. These duties 
arose, among other reasons, because of the level of inside knowledge possessed by the directors. 
Because of the fiduciary duties that existed the directors were obliged to not make misleading 
statements and to disclose material maters as to which they knew the shareholders were inadequately 
informed. Based on this case it is likely that a fiduciary relationship would arise between a promoter of 
securities and the subscriber because of the information asymmetry between the parties. 
In Cox & Coxon Ltd v Leipst17 the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that section 9 
of the FTA only prohibits certain conduct, it does not "render representations 
binding." 18 However section 6 of the CRA 1979 does make representations binding if 
they induce entry into a contract. It entitles the representee to damages "as if the 
representation were a term of the contract." 19 The Court in Coxon held that a 
misrepresentation inducing entry into a contract cannot "give rise to a claim for 
expectation losses"20 under the FTA 1986. Thus, the broad provisions of the FTA 
1986 do not completely override the need for the CRA 1979. 
The law concerning misrepresentation discussed in this section has the effect of 
providing a penalty for fraudulent disclosure and for non-disclosure that amounts to a 
misrepresentation. The relevance of this to New Zealand's mandatory disclosure 
regime will be discussed in Part II, II A 2 (a) of this paper. 
17 [1999] 2 NZLR 15 (CA). 
18 Cox & Coxon Ltd v Leipst above n 17, 22 per Gault J. 
19 Contractual Remedies Act 1979, s 6(l)(a). 
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II THE COMPANIES ACT 1993 
A Financial Information 
1 Accounting records 
Section 194 of the Companies Act 1993 (CA 1993) imposes a duty on companies to 
keep accounting records. These records must comply with the Financial Reporting 
Act 1993.21 It is the board of directors' responsibility to keep accounting records. 22 If 
the board fails to comply with this requirement the every director23 commits an 
offence is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000.24 
2 The annual report 
Section 208 of the CA 1993 requires the board of every company to prepare an 
annual report. Under section 209 this report has to be sent to the shareholders "not 
less that 20 working days before the .. . annual meeting of shareholders." Under 
section 211 the annual report must contain the financial statements prepared "in 
accordance with section 10 of the Financial Reporting Act 1993"25 and the auditor's 
report on those statements.26 These financial statements are discussed in Part I, III E 
of this paper. The annual report must also include the interests register entries,27 
remuneration received by the directors, 28 and other items.29 If the annual report is not 
sent to the shareholders every director of the company commits an offence and is 
liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000.30 
20 Cox & Coxon Ltd v Leipst above n 17, 26 per Henry J. 
21 Companies Act 1993, s 194(l)(c) [CA 1993]. The Financial Reporting Act 1993 is discussed in Part 
I, III E of this paper in the section dealing with disclosure under the Securities Act 1978. 
22 CA 1993, s 194(1). 
23 CA 1993, s 126 defines a director as "any person occupying the position of a director of the company 
by what ever name called." The focus is on the duties and powers of the person and the definition is 
not limited to persons on the board of directors. 
24 CA 1993, s 194(4). 
25 CA 1993, s 21 l(l)(b). 
26 CA 1993, s 21 l(l)(c). 
27 CA 1993, s 21 l(l)(e). This is discussed in Part I, II B of this paper. 
28 CA 1993 21 l(l)(f). 
29 Other items to be included in the annual report include a description of changes in accounting 
policies, changes in the nature of the business, donations made by the business, and the number of 
employees who received $100,000 or more remuneration (CA 1993, s 21 l(a),(d),(g), and (h)). 
3° CA 1993, s 208(2). 
8 
B The Interests Register 
A company must keep an interests register at its registered office. 31 This is a "list of 
material interests which the directors have in businesses with which the company is 
dealing or transactions involving the company."32 The information to be included in 
the interests register includes; a director's interest33 in transactions of the company,34 
information acquired in his or her capacity as a director which is to be used other than 
for the purpose of the company or that is to be disclosed to any person,35 information 
concerning a director's acquisition or disposition o_f shares issued by the company,36 
and any remuneration received by a director.37 
C The Annual Return 
Under section 214 of the CA 1993 the board must ensure an annual return is 
delivered to the Registrar of Companies each year for registration.38 The annual 
return must contain information specified on the Forth Schedule to the CA 1993. This 
information includes the address of the company, details of where records are kept, 
information relating to the shares and the shareholders of the company, and the names 
and addresses of the directors of the company. 39 If the board fails to comply with this 
requirement every director commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine 
not exceeding $10,000.40 
D Inspection of a Company's Records 
31 CA 1993, s 189(l)(c). 
32 Andrew Beck and Andrew Borrowdale, Guidebook to New Zealand Companies and Securities Law 
(5 ed, CCH New Zealand Limited, Auckland, 1994) 208. 
33 CA 1993, s 139 defines when a director is 'interested' in a transaction, it includes situations where 
the director is a party to the transaction, will derive a material financial benefit from the transaction, or 
has a material financial interest in another party to the transaction. 
34 CA 1993, s 140(1). 
35 CA 1993, s 145(3)(a). 
36 CA 1993, s 148(l)(b). 
37 CA 1993, s 161(2). 
38 CA 1993, s 214(1). 
39 The Forth Schedule to the CA 1993. 
4° CA 1993, s 214(10). 
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A company must keep records available for inspection by the public for inspection 
by its shareholders. The information available to the public is general information 
about the company including the share register and the company constitution.41 The 
information available the shareholders includes the interests register, minutes of all 
meetings and resolutions of shareholders, and information given to all of the 
shareholders during the previous 10 years.42 If the company fails to comply with 
these two requirements every director commits an offence and is liable on conviction 
to a fine not exceeding $10,00043 and the company commits an offence and is liable 
on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000.44 
E Disclosure of a Company's Records 
1 Section 178 of the Companies Act 1993 
Section 178(1) states that "[a] shareholder may ... make a written request to a 
company for information held by that company." The company must either provide 
the information, agree to provide the information within a specified period, or refuse 
to provide the information, within 10 working days of receiving the request. 45 The 
company must specify the reasons for a refusal to provide information.46 Reasons for 
which a company may refuse to supply information include that "[t]he disclosure of 
the information would or would be likely to prejudice the commercial position of the 
company"47 or of "any other person"48 or that "the request . . . is frivolous or 
vexatious."49 If the High Court is satisfied that the company "did not have sufficient 
reason to refuse to supply the information," or that "other reasons exists that outweigh 
the refusal," it may "make an order requiring the company to supply · the 
information. "50 
41 CA 1993, s 215. 
42 CA 1993, s 216. 
43 CA 1993, ss 215(2)(b) and 216(2)(b). 
44 CA 1993, ss 215(2)(a) and 216(2)(a). 
45 CA 1993, s 178(3). 
46 CA 1993, s 178(3)( d) . 
47 CA 1993, s 178(4)(a). 
48 CA 1993, s 178(4)(b). 
49 CA 1993, s 178(4)(c). 
5° CA 1993, s 178(7). 
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2 Section 179 of the Companies Act 1993 
Under section 179(1) of the CA 1993 a shareholder or a creditor of a company can 
apply to the High Court for a person to inspect a company's records. The Court may 
authorise the person to inspect the company's records if the inspection is for a proper 
purpose and the shareholder or creditor is acting in good faith. Under section 179(4), 
on receiving the report of the inspector, the Court can make an order in relation to 
disclosure of records and information, as it thinks fit. 
F Dealing with Shares 
1 Repurchase of shares 
There are disclosure requirements relating to a company buying back its own shares. 
These requirements are different for different types of share buy-back. 
For a proportional buy-back51 the board has to resolve that "it is not aware of any 
information that will not be disclosed to shareholders- (i) [ w ]hich is material to an 
assessment of the value of the shares; and (ii) [a]s a result of which the terms of the 
offer and the consideration offered for the shares are unfair to shareholders accepting 
the offer."52 Thus, often the board will not be able to carry out this type of buy-back 
unless disclosure is made to the shareholders. 
For a selective buy-back53 the company must send a disclosure document to all the 
shareholders.54 This document must include the nature and terms of the offer; the 
relevant interest of any directors in any of the shares, the text of a resolution that the 
acquisition is of benefit to all the remaining shareholders and that the terms of the 
offer are fair and reasonable to them, and any further information necessary to enable 
51 CA 1993, s 60(l)(a). This is when a company makes an offer to all shareholders to acquire a portion 
of their shares. The offer must not affect relative voting and distribution rights (this means the 
shareholders must be entitled to participate rateably). 
52 CA 1993, s 60(3)(c). 
53 CA 1993, s 60(l)(b). This is when a company makes an offer to acquire the shares of one or more 
shareholders with the consent of all the other shareholders. 
54 CA 1993, s 60(5). 
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a shareholder to understand the implications of the a~quisition for the company and 
the shareholders. 55 
For a stock exchange acquisition56 a disclosure document must be sent to all 
shareholders. 57 This document58 is similar to the one required for selective buy-backs. 
Under section 65 information may be disclosed subsequent59 to a stock exchange 
acquisition if the number of shares acquired does not exceed 5% of the shares of the 
same class.60 
2 Redemption of shares 
Share redemption is different from a repurchase of shares because it does not 
require the consent of both the company and the shareholder involved. The company 
or the shareholder can exercise share redemption unilaterally. 61 For a share to be 
redeemable by the company the constitution of the company has to make provision 
for the redemption in one of three ways. These are "at the option of the company," 
"at the option of the holder of the share," or "on a date specified in the constitution."62 
The consideration to be paid for the shares must be either specified, calculated by 
reference to a formula, or required to be fixed by a person not associated with the 
interests of the company.63 
There are three ways a company can exercise its option to redeem shares. Firstly, 
the option can be exercised "in relation to all shareholders of the same class and in a 
manner that will leave unaffected relative voting and distribution rights."64 Secondly, 
the option can be exercised "in relation to one or more shareholders and ... [a]ll 
shareholders have consented in writing."65 Thirdly, the option can be exercised "in 
55 CA 1993, s 62. 
56 CA 1993, s 63. This is an offer made through the stock exchange to all shareholders to acquire a 
specified number of shares. 
57 CA 1993, s 63(6). 
58 CA 1993, s 64. 
59 Within 10 working days after the share are acquired (CA 1993, s 65(2)). 
6° CA 1993, s 65(l)(b). 
61 Beck and Borrowdale, above n 32, 102. 
62 CA 1993, s 68(a),(b), and (c). 
63 CA 1993, s 68(d),(e), and (f). 
64 CA 1993, s 69(l)(a). 
65 CA 1993, s 69(l)(b)(i) . 
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relation to one or more shareholders and ... the option is expressly permitted by the 
constitution."66 
For the exercise of the option under the third way a disclosure document must be 
sent to each shareholder.67 This document must set out the nature and terms of the 
redemption and the names of the shareholders that the option is to be exercised in 
relation to, the text of a board resolution that the redemption is of benefit to the 
remaining shareholders, that the consideration for the redemption is fair and 
reasonable to them, and the grounds for these conclusions, and any further 
information and explanation necessary to enable a shareholder to understand the 
implications of the redemption for the company and its shareholders.68 
3 Financial assistance 
Section 76 of the CA 1993 allows a company to "give financial assistance to a 
person for the purpose of ... the purchase of a share issued or to be issued by the 
·company." There are three options for giving financial assistance. 
Firstly, all shareholders can consent to the giving of the assistance.69 In order for 
the shareholders to consent, the particulars of the assistance would have to be 
disclosed to them. 
Secondly, the company may give assistance complying with section 78.70 Under 
section 78(5) a disclosure document complying with section 79 must be sent to each 
of the shareholders. This document must set out the nature and terms of the financial 
assistance, the text of a resolution that the assistance is for the benefit of the 
shareholders not receiving the assistance and that the terms and conditions of the 
assistance are fair and reasonable to those shareholders, and such further information 
and explanation necessary to enable a shareholder to understand the implications of 
the assistance for the company and the shareholders.71 
66 CA 1993, s 69(l)(b)(ii). 
67 CA 1993, s 71(1)(5). 
68 CA 1993, s 72. 
69 CA 1993, s 76(1)(a). 
7° CA 1993, s 76(1)(b). 
71 CA 1993, s 79. 
Thirdly, the company may give assistance m accordance with section 80.72 
Financial assistance under section 80 can only be given if the amount of the assistance 
would not exceed 5 percent of shareholders' funds. 73 Under section 80(1)(b) a 
disclosure document has to be sent to each of the shareholders. This document must 
set out the class and the number of shares in respect of which the financial assistance 
has been given, the consideration paid for those shares, the identity of the person 
receiving the assistance, and the amount of financial assistance.74 
G The Registrar's Powers of Inspection 
Under section 365 of the CA 1993 the Registrar of Companies (or a person 
authorised by the Registrar) may, if in their option it is in the public interest to do so, 
require a banker to produce for inspection relevant documents,75 "inspect and take 
control of relevant documents",76 or take possession of or retain relevant documents,77 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether a company or director is complying with, 
detecting offences against, and ascertaining whether the Registrar should exercise any 
of his or her powers under the CA 1993 or the FRA 1993.78 
Section 366 of the CA 1993 allows for disclosure of information and reports. A 
person who has obtained a document or information in the course of an inspection 
under section 365 or prepared a report in relation to an inspection under section 365 
must give the document or information to certain persons if directed to do so by the 
Registrar.79 The persons the information can be given to include the Minister of 
Justice, the Secretary for Justice, a person authorised by the Registrar to receive· the 
information for the purposes of or in connection with the exercise of powers under the 
CA 1993 or detecting offences under the CA 1993, and a liquidator. 80 A person who 
72 CA 1993, s 76(l)(c). 
73 CA 1993, s 80(l)(a). 
74 CA 1993, s 80(l)(b). 
75 CA 1993, s 365(l)(c). 
76 CA 1993, s 365(l)(d) . 
77 CA 1993, s 365(l)(e) and (t). 
78 CA 1993, s 365(l)(a)(i),(ii), and (iii). 
79 CA 1993, s 366(l)(a) and (b). 
8° CA 1993, s 366(l)(c),(d),(e),(t), and (g). 
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fails to comply with section 366 commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a 
fine not exceeding $10,000. 81 
H Privileged Communications 
Section 393 of the CA 1993 says, "nothing in the Act requires a legal practitioner to 
disclose a privileged comrnunication."82 This does not apply to the liquidator's power 
to require information from a solicitor. 83 The High Court "may, on application of any 
person, determine whether or not a claim of privilege is valid."84 
81 CA 1993, s 366(4). 
82 CA 1993, s 393(1). 
83 CA 1993, s 393(2). 
III THE SECURITIES ACT 1978 
A The Scope of the Securities Act 1978 
The Securities Act 1978 [SA 1978) concerns the offering of securities to the 
public. 85 A security is defined as "any interest or right to participate in any capital, 
assets, earnings, royalties, or other property of any person."86 This definition covers 
shares, bonds, debentures, and all other types of security. 
B Section 33 
Section 33 in Part II of the SA 1978 states: "No security shall be offered to the 
public for subscription, by or on behalf of an issuer, unless - (a) [t]he offer is made in, 
or accompanied by, an authorised advertisement that is an investment statement that 
complies with this Act or regulations; or (b) [t]he offer is made in an authorised 
advertisement that is not an investment statement; or (c) [t]he offer is made in, or 
accompanied by, a registered prospectus that complies with this Act and 
regulations."87 The issuer is "the person on whose behalf any money paid in 
consideration of the allotment of the securities received."88 This is the company 
issuing the securities to the public. Section 3(2) of the SA 1978 concerns when an 
offer is not to the public. This includes an offer of securities to relatives or business 
associates of the issuer and persons whose business is the investment of money. 
Therefore 'public' is intended to cover people who do not have relevant information 
about the issuer or the means to get that information. There are some specific 
exemptions from Part II of this Act set out in section 5 of the SA 1978.89 
C The Investment Statement 
84 CA 1993, s 393(5). 
85 The long title of the Securities Act 1978 (SA 1978) say it is "[a]n Act to establish a Securities 
Commission; and to consolidate and amend the law relating to the offering of securities to the public, 
and to extend the application thereof." 
86 SA 1978, s 2D. 
87 SA 1978, s (l)(c). 
88 SA 1978, s 2(1). 
89 These include an exemption for registered banks, mortgages of land and estates or interest in land. 
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A prospective investor must receive an investment statement before subscribing for 
a security.90 The investment statement is the primary disclosure document required 
for an issue of securities to the public. Its purpose is to "[p]rovide certain key 
information that is likely to assist a prudent but non-expert person to decide whether 
or not to subscribe for securities."91 The investment statement contains information 
about the securities being issued and the issuer.92 This information must not be false 
or misleading. 93 The investment statement must answer a number of questions these 
include:94 
What sort of investment is this? 
How much do I pay? 
What returns will I get? 
What are the risks? 
D The Prospectus 
The prospectus is "a document that contains an offer of securities to the public for 
subscription, and that is intended to be, or has been, delivered to the Registrar for 
registration ."95 The prospectus is a more detailed disclosure document than the 
investment statement. It was the primary disclosure document before October 1997. 
The prospectus does not have to be provided to an investor unless it is requested. The 
90 SA 1978, s 37 A(l)(a) if this section is breached the allotment of securities is "voidable at the 
instance of the subscriber"(SA 1978, s 37 A(3)) . 
91 SA 1978, s 38D(a), the requirement for an investment statement was included in this Act after 1993 
Parliamentary Accord on Retirement Income Policies (set up based on recommendations from the Todd 
Taskforce on Private Provision for Retirement (1991)) recommended new regulations for investment 
product disclosure. Two suggestion of the Periodic Report Group of the Accord were that "consumers 
should have access to unbiased information about the savings products they are considering" and that 
"the information should be clear, comprehensive, and designed to enable prudent but non-expert savers 
to make meaningful comparisons between similar savings products." (Interim Report of the Periodic 
Report Group, July 1997, 70.) This led to changes in the disclosure requirements, in the SA 1978, 
which came into effect on the l 51 of October 1997. These changes are designed to encourage people 
invest in the security market to save for their retirement. 
92 The requirements for an investment statement are contained in the Securities Regulation 1983 
Schedule 3D. See Appendix A for a list of the matter required to be disclosed. 
93 SA 1978, s 37 A(b) . If the information is false or misleading Section 37 A(3) applies (see note 90). 
Section 38F gives the New Zealand Securities Commission [NZSC] the power to suspend or prohibit 
the distribution of an investment statement if it is "likely to deceive, mislead, or confuse" (SA 1978, s 
38 F(l)(a)). 
94 Securities Regulations 1983 Schedule 3D, Regulation 1(1). 
95 SA 1978, s 2(1). 
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investment statement must state that a copy of the prospectus is available on request.96 
If a prospective investor asks for a prospectus the issuer is obliged to send them one 
within 5 working days.97 The requirements for a prospectus are set out in section 39 
of the SA 1978 and in the schedules of the Securities Regulations 1983.98 Section 41 
of the SA 1978 requires registration of the prospectus by delivering it to the Registrar 
of Companies.99 If the prospectus does not comply with the SA 1978 or contains 
faults the Registrar may refuse to register it. 100 If a statement in the prospectus is 
untrue 101 the directors who signed the prospectus are liable to pay compensation to all 
people who subscribed to the securities. 102 Distributing a prospectus with an untrue 
statement is also a criminal offence. 103 
E Financial Statements 
A The Financial Reporting Act 1993 
The purpose of the Financial Reporting Act 1993 [FRA 1993] is to "[r]equire 
issuers of securities to the public to file financial statements that comply with 
generally accepted accounting practice and give a true and fair view of their 
affairs." 104 To achieve this the FRA 1993 established the Accounting Standards 
Review Board105 [ASRB] . The function of the ASRB is to review financial reporting 
standards. 106 
Section 10 of the FRA 1993 creates an obligation on the directors of every 
"reporting entity" to prepare financial statements. A reporting entity includes an 
"issuer." 107 The definition of 'issuer' in section 4 of the FRA 1993 includes 
companies that have offered securities to the public in accordance with the SA 1978. 
96 Securities Regulations 1983 Schedule 3D Regulation 23A(e) . 
97 SA 1978, s 54B(2). If the issuer fails send the prospectus there could be a fine of up to $10,000 for 
the issuer and each of the directors (SA 1978, s 60(2)). 
98 See Appendix B. 
99 For the prospectus to be registered under section 41 it needs to be signed by the directors of the 
issuer and to contain all the information required under the Securities Regulations 1983. 
100 SA 1978, s 42(2). 
101 This means misleading in its form or by reason of an omission of information (SA 1978, s 55). 
102 SA 1978, s 56. 
103 SA 1978, s 58(5). The penalti~s may not exceed 5 years in prison or a $25,000 fine. 
104 The long title of the Financial Reporting Act 1993, (a) [FRA 1993). 
105 FRA 1993, s 22. 
106 FRA 1993, s 24. 
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Section 11(1) of the FRA 1993 states that the financial statements must comply with 
generally accepted accounting practice; this means financial reporting standards 108 
approved by the ASRB. 109 Under section 11(2) of the FRA 1978 if the financial 
statements "do not give a true and fair view of the matters to which they relate, the 
directors of the reporting entity must add such information and explanations as will 
give a true and fair view of those matters." The financial statements also have to be 
audited 110 and the auditor is required to prepare a report stating whether all of the 
information and explanations required have been provided, and whether the financial 
statements give a true and fair view of the company's affairs. 111 The directors of the 
issuer then have to register the financial statements with the Registrar of 
C · 112 ompames. The financial statements are a balance sheet, a profit and loss 
statement, and a statement of "cash flows.'' 113 These documents are to be included in 
the company's annual report. 
F Periodic and On Request Disclosures 
Section 54A of the SA 1978 requires information to be sent periodically to security 
holders. The details concerning the information to be provided is to be prescribed by 
regulation, however as yet there are no regulations dealing with this. 
Section 54B requires information to be disclosed to security holders on request. 
Under section 54B(l) the items listed in regulation 23A of the Securities Regulations 
1983 must be disclosed on request. These items include the prospectus, the 
investment statement, the annual report and financial statements of the issuer, deeds 
of trust or participation relating to the securities held by the security holder, a copy of 
any guarantee of payment of money owing in respect of these securities, and financial 
results relating to prospective financial information about the issuer or about returns 
on securities that were disclosed by the issuer. Under section 54B(3) if a security 
holder or a prospective investor requests a copy of the registered prospectus the issuer 
107 FRA 1993, s 2(1). 
108 FRA 1993, s 3. 
109 FRA 1993, s 27. 
110 FRA 1993, s 15. 
Ill FRA 1993, s 16. 
112 FRA 1993, s 18. 
113 FRA 1993, s 8(l)(a), (b), and (c). 
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must send them one and also any financial statements registered under the FRA 1993 
that are referred to in the prospectus and any documents extending the period during 
which allotments may be made under the registered prospectus. 
G The New Zealand Securities Commission 
The New Zealand Securities Commission [NZSC] was established by section 9 of 
the SA 1978. Its function is to review securities law and practice and .to "promote 
public understanding of' securities law and practice. 114 It has power to suspend or 
cancel a prospectus if the disclosure requirements of the SA 1978 and regulations are 
not complied with 115 and also power to exempt issuers from having to comply with 
any of the disclosure provisions of this Act. 116 The NZSC also investigates and 
publishes reports on suspected breaches of the disclosure provisions by issuers. 117 
114 SA 1978, s lO(b),(c), and (d) . 
115 SA 1978 s 38F(l). 
116 SA 1978, s 5(5). 
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IV THE NEW ZEALAND STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING RULES 
A Listing Contract 
To list on the NZSE an issuer must enter into a listing agreement with the NZSE. 
This is a contract between the NZSE and the issuer and the listing rules of the NZSE 
are terms in this contract. 118 The listing rules are enforceable against the issuer by the 
NZSE (the independent Market Surveillance Panel is also responsible for 
administering and enforcing the rules) or by any security holder of the issuer. 119 
Sanctions for a breach of the rules include suspension of the quotation of a security, 
cancellation of the listing of an issuer, 120 or disclosure of information to all 
participants of the NZSE. 121 
B Continuous Disclosure Obligation 
Section 10 of the listing rules deals with disclosure of information. Rule 10.1.l(c) 
states every issuer shall "release all Relevant Information to the Exchange 
immediately [when] it ceases to have greater value to the Issuer ... for the information 
to remain confidential. It shall not be a sufficient reason to withhold Relevant 
Information, that release of it may adversely affect the market price of any of the 
Issuer's Quoted Securities." 122 This is what is known as a continuous disclosure 
117 SA 1978, s 28A gives the NZSC the power to publish reports. There have been reports published on inquiries into prospectus disclosures of at least two issuers (Agricola Resources Limited (in July 1991) and Metropolitan Life Care Limited (in April 1996)). 118 In the case of New Zealand Stock Exchange v Listed Companies (1984) l NZLR 699 the Court of Appeal held that the relationship between the New Zealand Stock Exchange [NZSE] and the listed company is contractual not statutory. Thus the NZSE can vary its rules arbitrarily and is not subject to the administrative law remedies of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. The NZSE also has the power to interpret its listing rules and make rulings regarding the application of the rules. 119 Listing rule 2.1. l says the rules are "a contract enforceable against each Issuer for the benefit of every person who is or was a holder of Quoted Securities of that Issuer in the period in which the Issuer is or was listed and the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 shall apply accordingly." This is referring to section 4 of the Contracts (Privily) Act 1982, which concerns people who are not parties to a contract enforcing a promise made in it. Before an action at law by a security holder is commenced "such a party shall apply to have a determination made by the Exchange"(rule 1.4.3) to determine the meaning of the rules (pursuant to rule 1.4.1). 
120 Listing rule 5.4.2 gives the NZSE power to cancel or suspend a listing, rule 5.4.3(b) provides that an issuer not complying with the rules is a reason for the NZSE exercising its power under 5.4.2. 121 Listing rule 2.3.2(b) this information is disclosed by the Market Surveillance Panel not the NZSE. 122 Relevant information is defined in rule 1.1.2 as "at any time information received or generated and held by an Issuer about its undertakings, activities, business environment, prospects, financial position, or financial performance which is not reasonably available to an informed investor ... and which upon 
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obligation. Information that is to be disclosed has to be sent to the NZSE m 
accordance with rule 10.2. 
Thus, issuers have to disclose to all participants of the NZSE as much relevant 
information as they can without damaging their own interests. This requirement is 
based on the objectives of the NZSE. The NZSE states "[t]he main objective of the 
NZSE is to operate an open and efficient market. A reliable flow of information is 
vital to the attainment of this goal." 123 
C Information Already Released 
Rule 10.1.1 ( d) states every issuer shall "release Relevant Information to the 
Exchange no later than it is received by: (i) any person who is not bound by ... 
obligations of confidence . .. or (ii) any person who is likely to use it in deciding 
whether or not to deal with Quoted Securities of the Issuer or to divulge it ... to any 
such person." 
D Directors' Conflicts of Interest 
Rule 10.1.2 reqmres disclosure of "all arrangements . . . in respect of which 
Members of the Public ... might reasonably consider the Directors have a conflict of 
interest which may lead them to approve terms which are materially more favourable 
to the other parties than arm's length terms." This applies whether or not the 
information is 'relevant' .124 
E Annual Reports and Preliminary Announcements 
The NZSE rules also regulate the disclosure of annual reports under rule 10.5. 
These rules require more than just the information required by CA 1993. Rule 10.4.2 
requires a preliminary announcement to be released before the annual report. This 
announcement includes disclosure of major changes or trends in the issuer's business, 
disclosure to the market would, or would be likely to, affect materially the market price of any of the 
Issuer's Quoted Securities." 
123 Foreword to the listing rules. 
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the value of the issuer's assets, its profitability, and its contingent liabilities. Rule 
· 10.5.3 requires information about the names and holdings of the equity securities of 
the 20 largest holders, details about the spread of the security holders, and disclosure 
of the credit rating of the issuer. Rule 10.5.4 requires disclosure of any director 
appointed and the security holders who appointed that director. 
F A Company Acquiring its Own Securities 
A listed issuer must comply with rules 7.6.1 and 7.6.2 if it wants to acquire its own 
securities. Rule 7 .6.1 requires compliance with the CA 1993 provisions concerning 
this sort of acquisition. Rule 7 .6.2 requires that prior notice of the acquisition 125 be 
given to the NZSE if the acquisition is from a holder who holds more than a minimum 
holding 126 of the securities of the issuer. 
124 See note 122. 
125 The prior notice needs to specify "a period of time not exceeding 12 months from the date of the 
notice within which the Issuer will acquire Equity Securities" and "the Class and maximum number of 
Equity Securities to be acquired in that period" (rule 7.6.2(a) and (b)). 
23 
PART II THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MANDATORY 
DISCLOSURE 
I THE COMPANIES ACT 1993 DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS 
Before the CA 1993 was enacted there was a discussion in Parliament concerning 
the disclosure provisions. Two areas of disclosure were identified and discussed, and 
"[d]isclosure for the purpose of maintaining efficient and fair markets for the 
securities issued by companies was separated from disclosure for the purposes of ... 
'core company law' ."127 The former area of disclosure is covered by the provisions 
contained in the SA 1987 and the FRA 1993 and the latter area is covered by the 
provisions in the CA 1993. 
The disclosure provisions contained in the CA 1993 are "disclosure of managerial 
activity as a matter of associational interests" 128 and for the protection of creditors. 129 
The general reasons for mandating disclosure for 'core company law' differ from the 
reasons for mandating disclosure to regulate the security market. However, although 
the goals may be different, the specific disclosure required is often the same. This 
results in a duplication of disclosure requirements in these two areas. 
Below is a brief outline of the reasons for the CA 1993 disclosure provisions. This 
paper is not concerned with the validity of these reasons but it seeks to differentiate 
the reasons for disclosure based on company law from reasons based on regulation the 
security market. This is so that the justifications for the company law requirements 
are not used to justify regulation in the security market. 
The arguments in this section are not relevant in the context of the regulation of the 
security industry since any deficiency in achieving these goals can be remedied by 
strengthening CA 1993, requirements not the disclosure regime in the SA 1978 or the 
126 A minimum holding of securities is the number of securities set out in appendix 2 of the NZSE 
listing rules . This number depends on the price of the securities. 
127 David Wishart, Company Law in Context (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1994) 258. 
128 Wishart, above n 127, 258. 
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listing rules. In this section 'mandatory disclosure' refers to the disclosure 
· requirements in the CA 1993. 
A The Shareholders' Monitoring of Management 
Disclosure of information may allow shareholders to see whether a director has 
breached his or her fiduciary duties. Shareholders have incentives to monitor 
management "in order to reduce the likelihood that the managers will undertake 
actions that are inefficient or involve misappropriation of company assets." 130 This 
monitoring would limit dishonest conduct by the directors. Disclosure can also 
allocate responsibility where it belongs, rather than the whole company being 
punished for dishonest conduct by one manager. Thus, mandatory disclosure in the 
context of company law useful for making management accountable for fraud. 
Disclosure of information is often compared to sunlight, in that it has a disinfectant 
effect, because its exposes managerial behaviour and increases accountability. 131 
1 Reducing agency problems 
Required disclosure can help to "reduce the cost of monitoring promoters' and 
managers' use of corporate assets for self interested purposes." 132 This was one of the 
original reasons for security disclosure in England and in the United States. 133 The 
disclosure required for this purpose is periodic, ongoing disclosure to enable 
shareholders to identify breaches of management's duties. 134 This is the type of 
disclosure required by the CA 1993. The SA 1978 requires one-off disclosure for the 
issue of shares and little periodic disclosure. 135 The NZSE listing rules require 
129 Wishart, above n 127,258. 
130 Mark Blair and Ian M. Ramsay, "Mandatory Corporate Disclosure Rules and Security Regulation" 
in Gordon Walker and Brent Fisse (eds) Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand, (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1994) 265, 269. 
131 Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary: Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Materiality 48 Cath UL 
Rev 93, 95 - 96. 
132 Paul G. Mahoney, Mandato,y Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems 62 U Chi L Rev 1047, 
1048. 
133 Mahoney, above n 132, 1055 - 1077. 
134 Mahoney, above n 132, 1079. 
135 The main periodic disclosure required under the SA 1978 is the financial statements to be included 
in the issuer's annual report. 
25 
extensive ongomg disclosure but this is for the purpose of efficiency136 not 
accountability. 
2 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance means "the . . . mechanisms that shape the structure of 
incentives, disincentives, and prohibitions under which an issuer's management makes 
decisions." 137 Mandatory disclosure (under the CA 1993) may help with corporate 
governance. Disclosure can help large shareholders of an issuer more effectively 
"exercis[e] their voting franchise." 138 This is because they may be more informed 
than under a voluntary disclosure regime. It can also help shareholders to "enforce 
management's fiduciary duties." 139 In this way it can help with the corporate 
governance of an issuer. 
When applied to securities regulation this justification seems to be more of a 
retrospective justification rather than the reason the legislation was enacted. In my 
opinion, although the SA 1978 and the listing rules may increase corporate 
governance, they should not be directed at this purpose since regulation for this 
purpose is contained in the CA 1993. 
3 Other reasons 
Two of the reasons, which can be used to justify disclosure in the area of company 
law are dealt with in the next section because they are often used to justify mandatory 
disclosure in the securities industry. These are deterrence of fraud and protection of 
investors. 
136 See quote referred to by note 123. 
137 Merritt B. Fox, Challenges to Corporate Governance: Required Disclosure and Corporate 
Governance 62 Law & Contemp Prob 113 [Corporate Governance]. 
138 Corporate Governance, above n 137, 116. 
139 Corporate Governance, above n 137, 118. 
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II THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECURITIES 
. ACT 1978 AND THE NEW ZEALAND STOCK EXCHANGE 
LISTING RULES 
In the remainder of this paper 'mandatory disclosure' is used to refer to the 
regulation of the securities industry contained in the SA 1978 and the NZSE listing 
rules. 
A The Level of Disclosure Without a Mandatory Regime (Voluntary 
Disclosure) 
This section discusses what the level of disclosure without any regulation would be. 
If disclosure is voluntary it is the management of the issuer not the investors or the 
government that determine how much to disclose. 140 Therefore a discussion of the 
level of disclosure without regulation involves an analysis of the costs and benefits of 
disclosure to the managers. 
1 Incentives to disclose information 
Market forces drive a public issuer to disclose information to the public. 141 This is 
proven by the fact that before there were any disclosure requirements issuers would 
disclose financial statements and other information to the market. 142 There are a 
number of incentives for the managers of the issuer to disclose information, these are 
mentioned below. 
Because of these incentives the issuer will release information to the market. This 
may result in improved market efficiency and fairness. 143 If optimal market 
efficiency and adequate fairness is achieved under a voluntary disclosure regime there 
may be no need of mandatory disclosure requirements. 
140 Merritt B. Fox "Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is not Investor 
Empowerment" (1999) 85 Va L R Fox 1336, 1341 [Retaining Disclosure]. 
141 George J. Benston Voluntary Vs Mandatory Disclosure (Report Prepared for the New Zealand 
Business Round Table 1997) 23. 
142 Benston, above n 141 , 13 says, " .. . financial accounting statements were offered to investors long 
before they were required by law." 
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( a) Competition between issuers 
An issuer can gain an advantage over competing issuers by disclosing favourable 
information about their business that can be compared with competing issuers. 144 
Disclosure of information is important for an issuer with high value business to 
distinguish their business from competitors. 145 Non-disclosure of a category of 
information that competing issuers disclose can lead investors to assume the worst. 
This could affect the price of the issuer's securities. Thus, competition drives the 
management of an issuer to disclose information voluntarily. 
(b) Monitoring by shareholders 
To maintain the price of an issuer's securities the managers of an issuers will want 
to "produce information (good or bad) which aids in the monitoring of [their] 
performance by shareholders and others" 146 This is because if shareholders are 
uncertain about an issuer's performance the issuer's share price will go down. There 
is an incentive for bad news to be disclosed to stop investors assuming even worse. 
Thus, issuers have "strong incentives to determine the kind of information ... that 
investors prefer" 147 and managers of an issuer will disclose information voluntarily to 
reduce shareholders' monitoring costs. This incentive is discussed further in Part II, 
II B 4 ( c )(ii) of this paper. 
( c) The reputation of the issuer 
Managers want the issuer to have a reputation that it is competent and can be 
trusted. If there is insufficient information investors will not be able to evaluate the 
issuer and this reputation cannot be developed. 148 
143 Efficiency and fairness are the two primary justifications for mandatory disclosure. 
144 Benston, above n 141, 15. 
145 Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffery M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization (2 ed, HarperCollins 
College Publishers, New York, 1994) 620. 
146 R Dugan and P Gorringe Fairness and Incentives: Economics and Law Reform (Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 1990) 60. 
147 Benston, above n 141, 14. 
( d) Adverse selection 
Generally managers will want to disclose good news to the market since this is 
likely increase the value of the issuer's securities. According to the adverse selection 
argument, when one issuer discloses positive information about their product and 
other issuers disclose nothing, investors will assume that the non-disclosing issuers 
have an inferior product. 149 This will lead all issuers to disclose information whether 
good or bad to prevent the signals given off by non-disclosure. 
2 Disclosure under a voluntary disclosure system 
( a) The role of the law of misrepresentation 
Both the disclosure rules and the general law contain a prohibition on fraudulent 
statements. Requiring an issuer to disclose information is ineffective without this 
penalty for fraudulent statements.150 Thus, it may seem that it is only necessary to 
have a penalty for misrepresentations and leave disclosure to the operation of the 
market. 151 This may require strengthening New Zealand's misrepresentation law and 
providing harsher penalties for misrepresentation. Under this view there is no need 
for the disclosure provisions in the CA 1993 or securities industry. However, this 
relies on the effective enforcement of the antifraud 152 laws. 153 It is hard to enforce 
these laws if no disclosure is required. This argument also relies on disclosure being 
costless to the issuer. 
Therefore because of the difficulty with enforcing anti-fraud laws it may be 
necessary to require disclosure of information. However this disclosure would not 
need to be more than that required by the CA 1993 which is aimed at deterring 
fraudulent conduct. 
148 Benston, above n 141, 16. 
149 Dugan and Gorringe, above n 146, 61. 
15° Christopher J. H. Donald A Critique of Arguments for Mandatory Continuous Disclosure 62 Sask L 
Rev 85, 91- 92. 
151 This view is put forward in Donald, above n 150, 88 - 93. 
152 Anti-fraud laws refers both to laws dealing with dishonest conduct by issuers and laws dealing with 
misrepresentations. 
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(b) A market approach 
The justifications for mandatory disclosure assume that the government and the 
NZSE can produce the correct level of information and that issuers are unable to do 
this privately. However, it may be possible to leave disclosure to the operation of the 
market. 
Firstly, issuers have incentives to disclose information to investors. The 
information investors require will vary for different groups of investors and different 
kinds of investment. 154 It may be hard for government to mandate disclosure in the 
interests of all investors however issuers have strong incentives to do this. Issuers 
could disclose information to target specific investors. Overall, this could result in 
adequate information being provided to all investors. 
Secondly, the management of an issuer can bind himself or herself usmg the 
constitution of the company. The constitution can require full disclosure of all 
relevant information and provide for liability if this requirement is breached. It is 
unlikely that this would result in much more disclosure than is already required under 
the CA 1993 but it could include disclosure of profit forecasts and other 'soft 
information.' This would eliminate the duplication of disclosure requirements caused 
by the SA 1978 and the NZSE listing rules. 
Investor confidence in managerial disclosure can be enhanced by outside 
certification of the accuracy of the disclosure or a sale of securities through an 
investment bank. 155 If the auditor or the investment bank were reputable this would 
increase investors confidence in the disclosures of the issuer. The investor could also 
insure against the possibility of inaccurate disclosure with an independent insurance 
firm. This would eliminate the risk of loss, resulting from non-disclosure of a 
category of information or fraud, not detectable comparison with other issuers or by 
the CA 1993 disclosure requirements. 
153 Carlton and Perloff, above n 145, 625. 
154 Benston, above n 141, 10 - 11. 
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Thus voluntary disclosure may be adequate if left to the market. 
3 The level of disclosure issuers will choose under a voluntary disclosure 
regime 
Many economists argue that an issuer's personal optimal level of disclosure 156 is the 
same as the optimal level for the whole economy if there are no externalities. 157 This 
would mean that in the absence of externalities mandating disclosure would not 
improve the amount of information released. However Professor Merritt B. Fox 
argues that the issuer's private optimal level of disclosure (POD) would be a lower 
level than the socially optimal level of disclosure (SOD) even when not counting 
externalities. 158 This is because at all levels of disclosure the costs are greater and the 
benefits are less for a POD than the SOD. 159 
(a) Costs 
The issuer has 'interfirm ' costs. These costs "arise from the fact that the 
information provided can put the issuer at a disadvantage relative to its competitors, 
major suppliers, and major customers." 160 This cost is only imposed on the issuer and 
not on society as a whole since, according to society's view, the interfirm cost 
imposed on one firm is balanced by the advantage conferred on the other firms. The 
private marginal costs of the issuer will exceed the socially marginal cost by the 
amount of the interfirm costs. 
155 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel , Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of In~estors 
70 Va L R 669, 675. 
156 This is where the marginal cost of disclosing the information is equal to the marginal benefit 
received. 
157 Benston, above n 141, 15 says, "Product providers can gain by providing investors with the 
information they require up to the point where the product providers' marginal cost of producing the 
information is equal to the marginal benefit (including savings from not having to get the information 
from other sources) obtained by investors . If there were no externalities (third party effects) and no 
fraud , I believe that all economists would conclude that this is the optimal situation for the economy 
and for individuals ." 
158 Retaining Disclosure, above n 140. Benston, above n 141, defines externalities as "information that 
could be used by all investors ." (page xii) This definition of externalities is based on the 'public goods 
hypothesis' (discussed in Part II, II B 4 (c) of this paper). Fox does not take this externality (a benefit 
to society but not the issuer) into account when assessing the issuer's private optimal level of 
disclosure. Therefore his analysis does not count externalities. 
159 See Appendix C for a graph illustrating this. 
160 Retaining Disclosure, above n 140, 1345. 
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A second reason that the issuer's private costs of disclosure are higher than the 
social costs is that "an issuer's managers are in an agency relationship with its 
shareholders." 161 Disclosure strengthens the shareholders' monitoring of management 
through increased effectiveness of shareholder voting and enforcing the managers' 
fiduciary duties. This is another cost on managers not imposed on society as a whole. 
(b) Benefits 
The issuer's management will not be able to capture all the benefits of disclosure. 
Thus, the socially marginal benefit will be greater than the private marginal benefit. 
The sorts of benefits an issuer cannot capture include a reduction in risk to investors 
with less than fully di versified portfolios 162 and "reduction in the agency costs of 
management." 163 
Therefore under a voluntary disclosure regime the private optimal level of 
disclosure for issuers may be less than the socially optimal level. This is a possible 
market failure that may be remedied by regulation. A mandatory disclosure regime 
requiring disclosure at the socially optimal level would correct this. However there 
are some problems with this argument. 
Firstly, it is hard to use regulation to make the disclosure of issuers reach the 
socially optimal level since this level would vary for different types of issuers and 
different types of securities and it may be hard to determine accurately what the 
socially optimal level is. 
161 Retaining Disclosure, above n 140, 1355. 
162 A reduction in risk caused by disclosure making a share value more accurate (closer one side or the 
other to its actual value) will not benefit an investor with a fully diversified portfolio since this sort of 
risk is already eliminated by the diversified portfolio. However for the investor with a less than fully 
diversified portfolio the reduction of the risk will be a gain to them. The issuer's management will not 
capture this sort of social gain. 
163 Retaining Disclosure, above n 140, 1357. Disclosure reduces the cost of shareholders monitoring 
the management's performance (a transaction cost) and thus restricts the management pursuing their 
own interests . The issuer's management will not capture this benefit to society as a whole. 
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Secondly, because a firm is in privity with its investors164 it will disclose 
information at the level best suited to them not to itself. Fox's argument is like those 
concerned with externalities (see Part II, II B 4(c) of this paper for a discussion of the 
public goods hypothesis which concerns externalities) in that it focuses unilaterally on 
the issuer's management's state of mind. Regarding this sort of argument Homer 
Kripe noted that: 165 
Such an argument .. . ignores the simple fact that an issuer must supply the information demands of the 
potential buyers of its securities . . . and firms desiring an active trading market in their securities must 
supply information sufficient to attract investor interest and to satisfy the needs of recommending 
brokers and analysts. The whole academic argument is irrelevant because it deals with information 
unilaterally produced in some kind of empty state of the world, instead of negotiating securities, where 
the recipient has some bargaining chips and uses them. 
B The Justifications for Mandatory Disclosure 
The description in Part I shows that in New Zealand there is a special regulatory 
regime, imposed on issuers of securities to the public, on top of existing business law. 
This is the SA 1978 and the NZSE listing rules. This regime involves mandating 
disclosure and a prohibition on fraudulent statements. In this section I will discuss the 
justifications for this mandatory disclosure regime. 
According to econmruc ideology the government should only intervene in the 
operation of a market if there has been some identifiable market failure. 166 Thus, the 
issue regarding every justification for mandatory disclosure is whether there is a 
'market solution' and if not, why should mandatory disclosure be the best method to 
solve this problem. 
There are also non-economic justifications for mandatory disclosure. Analysing 
these justifications involves identifying the problem to be addressed, analysing 
164 See Part II, II B 4(c)(ii) of this paper for a discussion of this. 
165 Homer Kripe, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a Purpose (1979) 118, 
quoted in Blair and Ramsay, above n 130, 273. In this extract Kripe was questioning the relevance of 
the public goods hypothesis as it applies to securities information. However his criticism also applies 
to arguments based on the incentives facing the issuer's management. 
166 Donald, above n 150, 87 see quote referred to by note 212. 
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whether government intervention is required and whether mandatory disclosure is the 
best solution to the problem. 
1 The recipients of disclosure 
Disclosure is aimed at a number of parties. The three primary parties are the 
shareholders of the issuer, the government, and the public. 167 Other parties include 
stakeholders in the company. 168 Stakeholders include "labo[u]r, consumers, local 
communities, or the public at large." 169 Other potentially interested parties are 
shareholders of other firms, 170 other firms in the same industry, and the stock 
exchange. 
Therefore, disclosure can be seen to be in the interests of society as a whole (the 
public) and in the interests of private investors. 171 The view you have of the intended 
recipient of disclosure determines the content of the disclosure requirements. The CA 
1993 disclosure requirements are primarily for investors and creditors of a company. 
However, the SA 1978 and the NZSE disclosure requirements, while been directed at 
investors, are also in the interests of society as a whole. This is because of the crucial 
role of the share-market in the economy. 172 
2 The security market 
Fraudulent disclosure can occur in many markets. In most situations only the basic 
misrepresentation laws apply. However, mandatory disclosure rules in the security 
industry are not only concerned with misrepresentations or fraudulent conduct, they 
are concerned with remedying perceived 'market failures' in the production of 
information. These market failures are said to affect the allocation of scarce resources 
because of the security market's crucial role in the economy. Thus, there is greater 
regulation of disclosure in the security market than in other markets. 
167 Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Moral Basis of State Corporate Law Disclosure 49 Cath UL Rev 697, 
706. 
168 Langevoort, above n 131, 93. 
169 Langevoort, above n 131, 93. 
170 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 155, 685. 
171 Chiappinelli, above n 167, 707 . 
172 This is discussed in Part II, II B 4(b) of this paper. 
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The security market is made up of two markets. These are the primary and the 
secondary market. The primary market is the market for the issuing of shares by 
issuers. The secondary market is the market involved with the trading of those shares 
between investors. Both markets are regulated by mandatory disclosure requirements. 
The primary market is regulated by disclosure requirements at the time of an issue of 
shares 173 and the secondary market is regulated by continuous disclosure required by 
· 174 an issuer. 
The primary reason that the security market is regulated is that there may be 'market 
failures' in the production of information. Another possible reason the security 
market is regulated is because of the high level of risk involved. Securities are not a 
normal product since their value is based on expected future earnings of the issuer. 
Therefore it is necessary that information concerning the issuer be disclosed. Apart 
from this risk, the fairness arguments for disclosure in the security industry are no 
more pressing than in other industries. In many markets there is an asymmetry of 
information between buyers and sellers and sellers have opportunities to exploit 
buyers. 
3 Two categories of justifications 
I have arranged the justifications for mandatory disclosure into two main categories. 
These are justifications based on efficiency and ones based on fairness. However, 
there is a lot of overlap between these two categories. Both can be broadly be said to 
be in the public good. Often things that are efficient are also fair; thus some 
commentators deal only with efficiency. However, the efficiency justifications do not 
cover all reasons for intervention based on fairness. Also many arguments that can be 
justified from an efficiency perspective are primarily concerned with fairness. I 
discuss these justifications in the section dealing with fairness justifications but I 
mention the efficiency justification for them as well. 
173 This regulation is mainly contained in the SA 1978. 
174 Both the CA 1993 and the NZSE rules have the effect of regulating the secondary market. 
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The efficiency arguments identify a specific market failure that needs to be 
remedied by government intervention; the fairness arguments involve remedying 
other social problems. One efficiency justification for mandatory disclosure not 
discussed in this section is Fox's argument discussed in Part II, A 3 of this paper. 
4 Efficiency 
A lot of security regulation and reform is justified from an economic perspective by 
accuracy enhancement of security prices. 175 This is based on the economic theories 
regarding security markets being efficient which are discussed below. Even the 
courts have embraced these theories.176 
(a) Informational efficiency 
Informational efficiency concerns how accurately and quickly the share price of a 
listed company reflects new information concerning the company. 177 This has also 
been called relative efficiency, which has been defined as "a measure of the speed 
with which new information is reflected in price." 178 The level of informational 
efficiency differs for different types of information but it is safe to assume that the 
share-market reflects publicly available information very promptly. 179 In New 
Zealand it is considered that within a few days of information being released to the 
175 Edmund W. Kitch The Theory and Practice of Security Disclosure 61 Brooklyn L Rev 763, 767 -
768. 
176 The United State's Supreme Court decision of Basic Inc v Levinson 108 S CT 978 (1988) applied 
the 'fraud-on-the-market' theory. This theory allows purchasers of a fraudulent issuer 's securities who 
"do not directly rely on misstatements"(page 989) to have a valid claim for fraud. This theory relies on 
the theory that the market is efficient and it is presumed that the prices of the securities have 
impounded the misstatements of the issuer. All the purchaser needs to prove is that they relied on the 
integrity of the market price. Thus, even the courts rely on the economic theory of efficient markets. 
177 Blair and Ramsay, above n 130, 275. 
178 Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency 70 Va L R 549, 
560. 
179 The discussion concerning the speed of informational efficiency divides the share-market's response 
to information into three categories. 'Weak-form efficiency' is when "the information contained in the 
past sequence of prices of a security is fully reflected in the current market price of that security," semi-
strong form efficiency is when "all publicly available information is fully reflected in a security's 
current market price," and strong-form efficiency is when "all information, whether public or private, is 
fully reflected in a security 's current market price." (Blair and Ramsay, above n 130, 276) For our 
purposes it is sufficient that the New Zealand share-market responds to all publicly available 
information (that is, it is has semi-strong form efficiency). The general academic consensus is that all 
share-markets are at least efficient in this way. This is because the informational efficiency of share-
markets has been backed up by empirical evidence (Gilson and Reinier, above n 178, 551). 
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market it will be reflected in the price of the issuer's shares so that it will not be any 
advantage for one investor to know more of the publicly available information than 
another investor. 180 
(b) Allocative efficiency 
Allocative efficiency concerns the efficient allocation of resources. In the context 
of the share market this means the way "the market allocates resources to their most 
efficient, or highly valued, uses." 181 Thus, it concerns the allocation of capital in the 
economy. The amount of public information disclosed in the security market 
determines the accuracy of security prices and this in turn determines the allocative 
efficiency of that market. More accurate and greater disclosure will lead to investors 
being able "to arrive at a more accurate assessment of a company's fundamental 
value." 182 Thus the share prices of the company will be more accurate. The share 
prices of a company are said to influence the ability of a company to obtain capital. 
This is because "the number of shares a company has to sell in order to raise a given 
amount of capital ... depends on the price at which such shares can be sold." 183 Thus 
the pricing mechanism provides the means for the most efficient firm obtaining 
capital ahead of other firms. 
According to this theory, mandatory disclosure in the secondary market will 
increase the allocative efficiency in the capital market if an issuer would not disclose 
adequate information voluntarily. 
The economic arguments based on efficiency are concerned with a deficiency in .the 
level of information provided by issuers voluntarily. These arguments are discussed 
below. 
(c) The public goods hypothesis 
180 Benston, above n 141, 11 - 12. 
181 Blair and Ramsay, above n 130, 275. 
182 Marcel Kahan Securities Laws and the Social Costs of 'Inaccurate' Stock Prices 41 Duke L J 977, 
985. 
183 Kahan, above n 182, 1005. 
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(i) Production of information 
There may be a market failure in the production of information because information 
concerning an issuer may have the characteristics of a public good. 184 This is because 
use of it by one person does not exclude others from using it, and does not deplete the 
total supply of the information available. When a pure public good is supplied by a 
private company there is usually an under production of it. An issuer will not capture 
the full benefit of the information since it is hard to get actual and potential investors 
to collectively pay for the information. Even though the investors may benefit from 
information it is difficult for them to enter into a collective agreement to pay for it, 
because it is easy for any investor to 'free-ride' and receive the information without 
paying for it. Therefore, the issuer will not produce the optimal amount of 
information voluntarily and regulation may be necessary to bring the level of 
information to the socially optimal level. 
(ii) Under investment m information research I Under production of 
information 
On the side of the securities analyst185 a sub-optimal level of information may be 
produced because there will be "insufficient securities research." 186 The analyst will 
be undercompensated for securities research because of free riding on information 
they gather. As a result of undercompensation there will be underinvestment m 
securities research. 187 This results in information being underprovided. 
However this may not justify mandatory disclosure. This is because management 
has incentives to disclose information. One practical reason for managers to disclose 
information is to reduce shareholders' monitoring costs. The shareholders' 
184 Blair and Ramsay, above n 130, 272 -273. 
185 This applies to both security analysts and to (actual and potential) investors . John C. Coffee, Jr. (in 
Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System 70 Va L R 717, 725 - 734) 
discusses the problem of under and over production of information in terms of the security analyst's 
research costs. Easterbrook and Fischel (above n 155, 681 - 683) discuss the problem in terms of the 
investor's under and over production of information. However, which ever way you look at it, the 
researching party will be undercompensated and there will be an under production of information and 
there will be a duplication of search costs by interested parties (security analysts or investors) . 
186 Coffee, above n 185, 725. 
187 Coffee, above n 185, 727. 
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monitoring costs are borne by the management smce if the shareholders cannot 
monitor management effectively they will discount managers' compensation. 188 This 
is an incentive for managers to voluntarily disclose information. 
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel questfon whether information is a 
public good in this way. 189 This is because a "firm is in privity with its investors" 190 
and the firm and the investors can thus "strike a mutually beneficial bargain."191 It is 
in the interests of the firm to disclose the amount of information that investors want. 
A firm with good news about itself will seek to make this known to actual and 
potential investors. The firm will also disclose bad news since if it does not investors 
may assume the worst. 
Thus, there are incentives on the firm and on the managers personally to disclose all 
the information the investors want to know. 
(iii) Third party effects 
Easterbrook and Fischel give 'third party effects' as a reason that disclosure may not 
be optimal. 192 This means, because information has the characteristics of a public 
good, firms will not disclose some information because other firms (and their 
investors) who benefit from this disclosure will not be prepared to pay for it, and 
disclosure by one firm unilaterally may give a competitive advantage to other 
firms .193 Thus, mandatory disclosure may be necessary to compensate for this. 
However, Christopher J. H. Donald suggests mandatory disclosure will not overcome 
this problem because "the real problem that free riding causes is not that firms will 
fail to disclose information but that they will fail to produce it in the first instance." 194 
188 Donald, above n 150, 99. Donald states that "compensation for managers' services will be 
discounted to take into consideration the fact that managers also receive non-pecuniary compensation 
either in the form of increased leisure, because they are shirking their responsibilities, or by causing the 
firm to incur expenditures that are really for the personal benefit of the managers which the 
shareholders cannot observe." 
189 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 155, 682 - 685. 
190 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 155, 682. 
191 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 155, 683 . 
192 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 155, 685 . 
193 Easterbrook and Fischel , above n 155, 685 - 686. 
194 Donald, above n 150, 111. 
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Thus, there may be the need of other government interventions such as strengthening 
intellectual property laws rather than mandating disclosure. 
(iv) The social waste hypothesis (Over investment in information research/ 
Over production of information) 
The social waste hypothesis applies to the duplication of the search costs for 
investors (or security analysts) finding information about an issuer. These costs result 
in a dead-weight loss. 195 This waste would be avoided if the issuer had to prepare 
information and report it and the one off cost was borne by all the investors. 
However, firms may provide the information voluntarily because they are in privity 
with their actual and potential investors. 196 Thus, there is an "incentive for the firm 
and the investors to co-operate with each other by agreeing to have the firm produce 
the information and disclose it to the market." 197 The extract by Kripe quoted 
above 198 makes this point. It is not sufficient to just look at firms own incentives, to 
disclose information, without considering its relationship with its investors. 
(d) Fraud 
There are two main arguments for mandatory disclosure based on protection against 
fraud. Fraud here means both dishonest conduct, for instance a director 
misappropriating the companies funds, and misrepresentations. Firstly, mandatory 
disclosure deters fraud, this relates to efficiency and fairness. This is because fraud 
can result in mis-pricing of securities and thus a misallocation of resources, and also 
in exploitation of investors. Secondly, mandatory disclosure increases accountability 
for fraud; this is an agency argument and has been dealt with in the section on 
company law justifications. 
(i) Deterrence 
195 Blair and Ramsay, above n 130, 269. 
196 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 155, 683. 
197 Donald, above n 150, 101. 
198 See quote refered to by note 165. 
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Mandatory disclosure can act as a deterrent against fraud. This is because if a 
manager's acts have to be disclosed the manager the manager is unlikely to be 
fraudulent and the disclosure rules provide penalties for misrepresentations. Thus, 
disclosure can prevent fraud before it happens rather than penalize it afterwards. 
The disclosure requirements under the CA 1993 should be sufficient to deter fraud. 
The extra disclosure required by the SA 1978 and the listing rules should be mainly 
concerned with the accurate pricing of securities not deterring fraudulent conduct. 
However I discuss the problem of deterring fraud here since many commentators give 
it as a reason to increase security disclosure. 
This justification for mandatory disclosure seems valid since without disclosure of 
information it may be hard to prove that the fraud occurred to create liability under 
the general fraud law. However under a voluntary regime fraudulent conduct that is 
not disclosed may be detectable by comparing the disclosure of an issuer with the 
disclosure of competing issuers. The Register of Companies could then investigate 
the issuer and compel the issuer to disclose information. 199 
(e) Problems with accuracy enhancement 
There are a number of problems with accuracy enhancement of share prices as a 
goal of mandatory disclosure. Firstly, if all material information necessary for 
accuracy enhancement is disclosed there may be harm to the issuer. This is because 
information may be confidential since there is a need of secrecy in a competitive 
environment.200 Thus mandatory disclosure could be damaging to issuers. 
Secondly, disclosure of forward-looking information necessary to create allocative 
efficiency may result in a risk of liability to the issuer.201 This is because an investor 
may sue the issuer on the basis of their disclosure. Because disclosure requirements 
create additional liability they may reduce the amount of information produced by 
199 See Part I, II G. 
200 Kitch, above n 175, 846 - 857. 
201 Kitch, above n 175, 840. 
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issuers. This is because issuers may not test their products if they do not know the 
outcome of the tests but know the outcome will have to be disclosed. 202 
Thirdly, Christopher J. H. Donald argues that informational efficiency may not 
necessarily improve allocative efficiency.203 He claims informational efficiency in 
the secondary market has little effect on allocative efficiency in either the secondary 
or the primary markets. It will have little effect on the secondary market because the 
information about the value of the firm will become known in that market eventually 
even if it is not disclosed.204 It will have little effect on the primary market because it 
is irrelevant for initial public offerings and seasoned issuers rarely issue more shares 
but prefer debt financing. 205 Donald notes "stock prices have little bearing on the 
ability of a seasoned issuer to raise capital by issuing debt."206 This point is also 
emphasised by Lynn A. Stout. Stout questions whether accurate prices affect the 
allocation of goods within the economy. She notes that it is assumed that share prices 
influence the allocation of resources. 207 The problems with this that she identifies are 
that companies "rarely rely on equity issues for funding, and stock prices have little or 
no influence on other, more commonly used sources of capital."208 Also a lot of firms 
never list on the stock exchange.209 The reason that other sources of capital are not 
affected by stock prices is that most corporate funding is raised by "internally 
generated cash,"210 other capital raised, which is financed by borrowing, is determined 
by "comparing outstanding debt against the value of a corporation's underlying assets, 
rather than the market price of its stock."211 
Both Donald and Stout claim that efficient pricing of securities does not 
significantly affect the allocation of resources. In my opinion this is a convindng 
argument. Thus, accurate prices of securities is not a valid justification for mandatory 
disclosure. However, there are justifications for disclosure based on fairness. 
202 Carlton and Perloff, above n 145, 623 - 624. 
203 Donald, above n 150, 101. 
204 Donald, above n 150, 102. 
205 Donald, above n 150, 103 - 105. 
206 Donald, above n 150, 107. 
207 Lynn A. Stout The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing 
and Securities Regulation 1988 641. 
208 Stout, above n 207,643. 
209 Stout, above n 207, 646. 
210 Stout, above n 207, 648. 
211 Stout, above n 207, 650. 
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5 Fairness 
Donald claims that "[c]onventional economic theory suggests that to justify any 
government intervention in the market place, some market failure must be 
identified."212 However there are some non-economic justifications for mandatory 
disclosure. The goal of these justifications is to "lead to a fairer distribution of 
information in society."213 The first disclosure Act passed in the United States sought 
to achieve three main objectives. Firstly, "investor protection," 214 secondly, deterring 
fraudulent conduct,215 and thirdly, restoring "investor confidence in the capital 
markets."216 Deterring fraud has been dealt with under the efficiency section; this 
section deals with both investor protection and investor confidence since they are 
related primarily to fairness. 
(a) Protection of investors 
Investors are vulnerable to abuse by issuers. This is because there is an asymmetry 
of information between the issuer and the investors. Mandatory disclosure can 
prevent exploitation of investors by requiring disclosure and providing for penalties 
for fraudulent disclosure. This is essentially a fairness reason but there may be a 
market failure because of the asymmetry of information. 
The first question is, what is the type of harm caused by issuers exploiting investors. 
Firstly, there may be damage to the value of the issuer's securities. The managers of 
an issuer would gain from misappropriating the issuer's funds for their own use. 
There could also be less severe damage to the issuer resulting from a conflict of 
interest between the managers and the shareholders.217 These sorts of agency 
problems are dealt with by the disclosure required by the CA 1993. 
212 Donald, above n 150, 87. 
213 Dugan and Gorringe, above n 146, 56. 
214 Kenneth B. Firtel Plain English: A Reappraisal of the Intended Audience of Disclosure Under the Securities Act of 1933 72 S Cal L Rev 851, 856. 
215 Firtel, above n 214, 856. 
216 Firtel, above n 214, 857. 
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Secondly, under a voluntary disclose regime it could be argued that the exploiting of 
investors by management not disclosing information could result in inaccurate share 
prices and excessive risk to investors. The CA 1993 could still deal with these 
problems since they are related to the agency relationship between managers and 
shareholders. Even if protection of investors is a valid goal of regulation of the 
security industry protection from inaccurate prices or excessive risk can be achieved 
without mandatory disclosure. Fox argues that share prices are unbiased under the 
efficient market hypothesis. This means, "share prices, on average, equal the actual 
value of the shares involved regardless of whether issuers are required to produce 
substantial or minimal disclosure."218 Thus an investor is protected, on average, from 
an unfair price by the markets pricing mechanism. An investor is protected from the 
risk that their shares are inaccurately priced by diversifying their portfolio.219 
The market would also solve the informational asymmetries between an issuer and 
its investors. Roberta Romano notes that "[b]ecause firms need capital and investors 
need information, firms have powerful incentives to disclose information if they are to 
compete successfully for funds against alternative investment opportunities."220 
Because of these powerful incentives managers have little scope to exploit investors. 
(b) Equality between investors 
Disclosure of simple financial statements that can be understood by any investor 
reduces any advantage that an expert investor has over non-expert investors because 
any publicly available information would be easily accessible. However this is not a 
valid reason for mandatory disclosure. 
Firstly, financial disclosure should ideally be aimed at sophisticated investor or 
investment analysts. 221 This is because they can assess real value of the firm and their 
trading, or advice, will cause this information to be impounded in the share price. 
217 For instance excessive management remuneration or managers entering into self interested 
transactions. 
218 Corporate Governance, above n 137, 116. 
219 Corporate Governance, above n 137, 116. 
220 Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation 107 Yale L J 
2379. 
221 Blair and Ramsay, above n 130, 269. 
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Less informed investors can free ride on their efforts.222 Thus, an expert has little real 
advantage since all publicly released information will be reflected in the share prices. 
Secondly, superior knowledge is just a consequence of effort and is not "at the 
11223 f 1 . f d . expense o ess m orme investors. Mark Blair and Ian Ramsay note that 
"[a]symmetric ... information between investors may simply reflect the differential 
costs and benefits that are associated with becoming informed."224 Also less informed 
investors can invest in unit trusts or indexed funds if they do not have the time to 
learn how to understand complex financial disclosures. 
(c) Informed decisions by investors 
One of the initial justifications for mandatory disclosure in the United States was 
that it would "enable the small investor to identify and invest in higher quality and 
lower risk securities."225 Thus it would increase informed decisions by investors. 
The Australian Government "supports mandatory disclosure rules on the grounds that 
such rules ... improve investment decisions by investors."226 This reason is similar to 
the two previous ones. It does not take into account the impounding of information 
into share prices and the incentives facing an issuer to disclose the information that 
investors want. 
(d) Protection of the integrity of the share market 
Mandatory disclosure can be justified as a way to protect investor confidence in the 
share market. 227 If investors fear that they will be taken advantage of they may not 
want to invest. 228 This argument can be justified by both fairness and efficiency. It is 
can be justified by fairness since its aim is to restore unsophisticated investors' 
confidence and encourage them to invest in the share-market. It can be justified by 
222 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 155, 694. 
223 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 155, 694. 
224 Blair and Ramsay, above n 130, 268. 
225 Coffee, above n 185, 723. 
226 Blair and Ramsay, above n 130, 267. 
227 Chiappinelli, above n 167, 699. Chiappinelli states that a primary purpose of federal disclosure is 
"increased confidence in the secondary capital markets"(page 699). 
228 Donald, above n 150, 114. 
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efficiency because if investors remove their funds from the capital market there will 
be less capital available and the market will be less efficient. 
Easterbrook and Fischel claim that this fear of investors is irrational.229 This is 
because there is no reason to expect exploitation from either other investors or the 
issuer for the reasons discussed above. 
The New Zealand Government introduced simple disclosure documents as a way to 
encourage investors to use the share-market to save for their retirement. 230 These 
documents may have this effect, however there are two problems with this goal of 
disclosure. Firstly, Government mandated disclosure might lead investors who had 
previously not trusted the share-market to believe certain investments are sound 
because they have had to comply with the disclosure requirements. This belief would 
be unjustified. Secondly, disclosure should be aimed at sophisticated investors since 
financial information can be hard to simplify and trading on the basis of simplified 
information may decrease the accuracy of share prices. Thus, the interests of society 
as a whole outweigh the benefits caused by encouragement of small investors to 
invest. 
However, the international community needs to have confidence in the New 
Zealand share market. If New Zealand abolished all its disclosure requirements it 
may not be able to attract overseas investors or issuers. Therefore, even though this 
lack of confidence may be irrational, it is a justifiable reason for mandatory disclosure 
in a small country like New Zealand. 
6 Establishment of a format for disclosure 
Another justification for mandatory disclosure is that it creates a model of how 
information about a company should be presented. Thus, it creates consistency in the 
disclosure by different issuers. This is useful for comparisons by investors between 
different investment products and to make it easier for investors to understand 
disclosure documents. However, a mandatory model could be made available which 
229 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 155, 694 - 695. 
230 See note 91. 
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issuers could adopt partially or fully. This would achieve the same goal. This 
argument is not a justifiable reason for imposing mandatory disclosure requirements 
on issuers. 
7 Other reasons for mandatory disclosure 
(a) Insider trading and disclosure 
In a company the directors have more information about the company than the 
shareholders. Thus, any trading by the directors in the issuer's shares can be seen as 
"trading with an informational advantage."231 However there are reasons why the 
directors should own shares in their company. These include to align their interests 
with the shareholders' interests, and to express their confidence in the company. 
Some argue that insider trading helps with accuracy enhancement because it releases 
information to the market. However, disclosure is clearly a better way of achieving 
this goal. 232 Total disclosure of all material information would cure insider trading 
but this is not possible. However, disclosure may still be justified as a partial remedy 
to insider trading because it reduces the opportunity for insider trading. In my 
opinion this argument does not justify mandatory disclosure. Every firm in the 
securities industry should not be obliged to disclose information because of the 
possibility that insiders in some firms might trade on inside information. A better 
way to prevent insider trading is to have legislation prohibiting it. 233 
(b) Public choice theory 
Mandatory disclosure has been explained on the basis of the public choice theory.234 
This view claims that disclosure is simply the result of pressure by various interest 
groups and not based on the "needs of investors nor considerations of market 
efficiency or market failure."235 These interest groups could be composed of lawyers 
231 Kitch, above n 175, 875. 
232 Kitch, above n 175, 878. 
233 The Securities Amendment Act 1988 creates liability for insider trading (ss 7 and 9). 
234 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 155, 694. 
235 Blair and Ramsay, above n 130, 274. 
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and other professionals employed in the securities industry. 236 The firms that have to 
spend money complying with the disclosure requirements may have difficulty 
forming counter interest groups because of apathy237 and problems with collective 
action. However, as we have seen there are many reasons for mandatory disclosure 
based on 'public benefit' and so it is unlikely that this regulation is purely motivated 
by interests groups. 
8 The costs of mandatory disclosure 
(a) Costs to issuers 
The management of an issuer may not voluntarily disclose information if the costs 
of preparing the information are greater than the benefits the issuer receives. 
Disclosure in this situation would be detrimental to both the issuer and investors 
(since this expense will be reflected in the issuer's performance). However, 
mandatory disclosure may impose greater costs to an issuer than the benefit the issuer 
receives . 
The costs of disclosure include fees for the employment of a number of 
professionals including a lawyer (to coordinate the preparation of reports), an 
accountant, an auditor, and other experts who may be required to give opinions.238 
Also there are publishing costs including costs for printing, artwork, and design of 
brochures. 
There are also costs of litigation associated with a mandatory disclosure regime and 
costs on the issuer for having to disclose confidential information. Lastly, there are 
'indirect' costs of having to disclose information that is inappropriate to investors.239 
This is because this type of disclosure could result in investors being misled. 
236 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 155, 671. 
237 Each firm may only be inconvenienced a small amount so it may not be worth their while 
campaigning against this regulation. 
238 For instance engineers or architects may give information about the cost of future constructions. 
239 Blair and Ramsay, above n 130,265. 
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The government would want to mandate disclose so the costs of disclosure reach the 
level of societies marginal cost. This would take into account the costs imposed on 
issuers. However, it is hard to assess costs accurately and weigh them up against 
benefits. This is especially the case when one broad disclosure regime is imposed on 
many different types of investment. If the costs are inaccurately assessed mandatory 
disclosure will not be of benefit to investors, issuers, or the public. 
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PART III CONCLUSION 
There is a complex mandatory disclosure regime in New Zealand for listed issuers 
issuing securities to the public. The regime consists of two levels, the SA 1978 which 
imposes disclosure requirements at the time of an initial issue of securities and the 
NZSE listing rules, which impose disclosure requirements as terms in the contract 
between a listed issuer and the NZSE. Breach of the disclosure requirements in this 
mandatory regime can attract harsh civil and criminal penalties. 
In New Zealand, the CA 1993 provides a system of mandatory disclosure for 
companies. These requirements are coupled with penalties imposed on the directors. 
Any disclosure, whether inside or outside this mandatory disclosure structure, is 
subject to the misrepresentations laws of New Zealand. This law contains both 
common law and statutory elements and provides penalties for misrepresentations. 
The question of whether the company law requirements or the law of 
misrepresentation need strengthening is a different question from whether New 
Zealand should have mandatory disclosure in the security industry. This paper does 
not question the necessity of these two levels of regulation but sets out the 
justifications for them. The two additional levels of regulation (the requirements in 
the SA 1978 and the NZSE listing rules), which I have labelled the 'mandatory 
disclosure regime' cannot be justified for the same reasons as disclosure under the CA 
1993 or the law of misrepresentation. 
Under a voluntary securities disclosure regime, the management of the issuer could 
provide guaranties that certain fraudulent conduct would not occur and investors 
could insure themselves to eliminate the risk of loss caused by fraud. However, this 
would be costly and mandatory disclosure may be a good way to reduce transaction 
costs and facilitate efficient voluntary transfers, like the role of having default terms 
in a contract. If this is the case the regulation should provide voluntary default terms 
rather than a mandatory disclosure regime. 
Efficiency is not a valid reason to justify mandatory disclosure because share prices 
do not substantially affect the allocation of resources. This is because seasoned 
50 
issuers have many sources of capital available to them other than new equity issues, 
which are not influenced by the share price of the issuer. Also the problems 
supposedly requiring mandatory disclosure because of efficiency are solved by the 
action of market forces. These market forces are the strong incentives of issuers to 
provide the information investors want. Also, under an efficiency analysis, the costs 
of disclosure might not justify the mandatory regime. If the costs exceeded the 
benefit to managers the regime would not be efficient. 
Problems related to fairness in the securities market do not justify mandatory 
disclosure. These problems are solved by the action of the market and even if they 
were not they could be dealt with by the disclosure required under the CA 1993. 
However, international confidence in New Zealand's share-market is a valid reason 
for mandatory disclosure. This is because the New Zealand share-market is small, 
dependent on international investment, and cannot afford to lose its reputation. 
Therefore, although none of the reasons for mandatory disclosure are justifiable, 
New Zealand should not unilaterally abolish its mandatory disclosure regime. What 
is needed is a clearer understanding of the lack of justification for mandatory 
disclosure internationally which would result in abolition of mandatory disclosure 
imposed on issuers of securities globally. Until this happens, issuers of securities in 
New Zealand and around the world will have to comply with this unnecessary 
restriction on their freedom to contract. 
APPENDIX A 
Section 38E of the Securities Act 1978 
38E(l) [Form and content] Every investment statement shall --
(a) Be in writing; and 
(b) State, in a prominent place, the date as at which the investment statement is 
prepared; and 
(c) If a registered prospectus is required in respect of the securities referred to in the 
investment statement, state that there is a registered prospectus containing an offer 
of 
securities to which the investment statement relates; and 
(d) Contain all information, statements, and other matters that it is required to contain 
by regulations. 
Securities Regulations 1983 Schedule 3D 
MATTERS REQUIRED IN INVESTMENT STATEMENTS 
1. Information at front of investment statement 
2. Description of securities 
3. Names and addresses 
4. Activities 
5. Moneys payable by subscribers 
6. Cooling-off period 
7. Types of charges 
8. Amount of charges 
9. Returns 
10. Guarantee of securities 
11. Risks 
12. Consequences of insolvency 
13. Alteration of securities 
14. Early termination 
15. Right to sell securities 
16. Enquiries about securities 
17. Complaints about securities 
18. Prospectus and financial statements 
19. Annual information 
20. On request information 
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APPENDIXB 
Section 39 of the Securities Act 1978 
39(1) [Content] Every prospectus and registered prospectus shall -
(a) Be in writing and be dated; and 
(b) Specify any documents required by section 41 of this Act to be endorsed on or 
attached to the prospectus or registered prospectus for the purposes of that section; 
and 
( c) Contain all information, statements, certificates, and other matters that it 1s 
required to contain by regulations made under this Act. 
Securities Regulations 1983 Schedule 1 
MATTERS REQUIRED IN REGISTERED PROSPECTUS FOR EQUITY 
SECURITIES 
General Requirements 
1. Main terms of offer 
2. Name and address of offeror 
3. Details of incorporation of issuer 
4. Principal subsidiaries of issuer 
5. Directorate and advisers 
[5A. Restrictions on director's powers] 
6. Substantial equity security holders of issuer 
7. Description of activities of issuing group 
8. Summary of financial statements 
9. Prospects and forecasts 
10. Provisions relating to initial flotations 
.... 
J 
11. Acquisition of business or subsidiary 
12. Securities paid up otherwise than in cash 
13. Options to subscribe for securities of issuing group 
14. Appointment and retirement of directors 
15. Directors' interests 
16. Promoters' interests 
17. Material contracts 
18. Pending proceedings 
19. Preliminary and issue expenses 
20. Restrictions on issuing group 
21. Other terms of offer and securities 
Requirements in respect of Financial Statements 
22. Application 
23. Balance sheets 
24. Capital and reserves 
[25. Minority interests] 
26. Deferred taxation 
27. Term liabilities 
28. Current liabilities 
29. Commitments and contingent liabilities 
30. Fixed assets 
31. Investments 
32. Current assets 
33. Intangible and other assets 
[34. Profit and loss statements] 
[35. Contents of profit and Joss statement] 
[36. Statement of cash flows] 
37. Other information 
38. Special provisions relating to financial institutions 
Miscellaneous Requirements 
39. Places of inspection of documents 
55 
40. Other material matters 
41. Directors' statement 
42. Auditor's report 
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APPENDIXC 
This graph illustrates how the issuer's private optimal level of disclosure may be a 
lower level of disclosure than the socially optimal level of disclosure. It is taken from 
Professors Fox's article noted at note 140. 
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